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STOCK PRICE REACTIONS TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE CORPORATION IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1991 
ABSTRACT 
This paper provides the first empirical analysis of the FDIC Improvement Act's (FDICIA's) 
impact on the banking industry. We examine the impact of events leading up to the Act's 
passage on the market value and systematic risk of commercial banks. We find that (a) large 
(small) bank stocks' value increased (decreased) as the FDICIA's passage became evident; and 
(b) large banks' systematic risk decreased significantly over the period surrounding FDICIA, 
while that of small banks did not change significantly. This supports Peltzman's (1976) 
"buffering effect" hypothesis that the market viewed FDICIA as protective of large banks. We 
postulate that such differences between large and small banks are due to risk-adjusted deposit 
insurance premia and restrictions on access to the Federal Reserve's discount window introduced 
through FDICIA. 
STOCK PRICE REACTIONS TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT 
INSURANCE CORPORATION IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1991 
I. Introduction 
The dramatic escalation of bank failures in the U.S. during the late 1980's and early 
1990's has attracted considerable public attention. It has been suggested that this crisis 
in the banking industry is, at least partially, due to the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation's (FDIC's) flat-rate insurance premium scheme. Such a pricing scheme is 
argued as being unfair to well-run institutions and, in fact, encourages excessive risk-
taking by bank management.1 In an attempt to reduce such incentives for moral hazard 
in the banking industry, regulatory reforms have been proposed and implemented. 
Among other things, these reforms have imposed risk-adjusted standards and closer 
supervision of riskier banks in order to maintain the safety and soundness of the banking 
industry, as well as to reduce the enormous burden that bank failures have imposed on 
the FDIC's Bank Insurance Fund (BIF). 
The most recent piece of banking legislation is the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), which was signed into law in December 1991. 
This Act has several broad objectives, it intends to reform federal deposit insurance, to 
protect deposit insurance funds, to recapitalize the bank insurance fund and to improve 
supervision and regulation of insured depository institutions. In short, FDICIA intends 
to protect the FDIC from further loss by adopting several measures that are aimed at 
curbing moral hazard behavior by bank managers. 
Two specific regulatory changes introduced by FDICIA are of particular 
importance since they greatly alter the structure of the "regulatory safety net" previously 
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in place. First, the Act incorporates a system of reassessment of deposit insurance 
premia. This is the first legislative attempt at redressing the incentive for banks' moral 
hazard behavior due to a flat-rate deposit in,surance scheme. FDICIA mandates a 
reassessment of a bank's premium rate on a semi-annual basis in order to recapitalize 
the bank insurance fund to the target reserve ratio in a period of fifteen years. Although 
such an alternative premium structure is still not theoretically, actuarially fair (banks can 
alter their portfolios immediately after a premium rate has been assessed), it 
nevertheless is a significant move toward ameliorating the risk-taking incentive inherent 
in a flat-rate deposit insurance premium structure that is based on an average risk 
measure across all banks. Unlike the flat-rate system in place prior to FDICIA, the 
premium rate under the new system is determined on a bank specific basis and thus, is 
risk-adjusted insofar as the bank's own historical risk profile is explicitly considered 
Further, the rate is reassessed semi-annually and thus, addresses any revisions in a bank's 
risk profile to a considerable degree. Second, FDICIA greatly curtails banks' access to 
the Federal Reserve discount window for emergency funds in periods of illiquidity. Such 
credit, which is an important dimension of the regulatory "safety net," also provides banks 
with a regulatory incentive for risk-taking since it is given at a subsidized rate (see Chen 
and Mazumdar (1994a, 1994b) or Kaufman (1990)). 
A central issue in the economics of regulation is identifying the intended and 
unintended benefits of regulatory actions and the agents which are supposed to receive 
them. A large body of literature examines the economic effects of regulation. Much of 
this literature uses tools from welfare economics to assess the extent to which regulation 
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affects market reactions. For example, in a seminal article, Stigler (1971) envisions a 
positive economics of regulation as specifying the arguments underlying the supply and 
demand for regulation. In his model, the good being transac.ted in the political market is 
a transfer of wealth, with constituents on the demand side and their political 
representatives on the supply side. The market distributes more of the good to that 
group of constituents whose effective demand is highest In this economic view of 
regulation, legislators do not necessarily promote the general welfare. Instead, benefits 
are captured by a small but dominant coalition that has a large per capita stake.2 
More recently, studies have relied on financial theory to infer the impact of 
regulatory changes. As argued by Schwert (1981), if markets are strong-form efficient, 
financial data is more informative than other measures because asset price movements 
incorporate all relevant information as soon as it becomes available. Several recent 
studies have employed stock market data to measure the effect of various regulatory 
changes in the banking industry (e.g., Allen and Wilhelm (1988), Brickley and James 
(1986), Cornett and Tehranian (1989, 1990), Flannery and James (1984), Musumeci and 
Sinkey (1990a, 1990b), Sundaram, Rangan and Davidson (1992), and Unal (1989)).3 
These studies utilize a financial theory paradigm to test for the effects of informational 
change associated with regulatory reform on stock prices.4 
Stigler (1971) posits that one coalition group can use the regulatory process to 
improve its relative competitive position within the industty. Posner (1974) points out 
that the differential effects of regulatory change on various industry members will cause 
members to campaign for regulation in a differential manner. More specifically, Stigler 
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(1974) argues that the incentive of large firms within the industry may differ substantially 
from their smaller counterparts. Empirical evidence supports these views. Several 
studies have found that the effects of a regulatory change are not homogeneous 
throughout the industry. For example, James {1983) finds that bank deregulation of 
deposit rate ceilings resulted in gains for wholesale banks but losses for commercial 
banks. Allen and Wilhelm (1988) present evidence that the Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 provided a wealth transfer from non-
Federal Reserve System member banks and Savings and Loans (S&ls) to Federal 
Reserve member banks and S&ls. Furthermore, Cornett and Tehranian (1989, 1990) 
find that the banking deregulations passed in 1980 and 1982 benefited stockholders of 
large banks and savings and loans, but produced negative abnormal stock returns for 
small depository institutions. 
In this paper, we examine the impact of information events in legislating and 
adopting the FDICIA of 1991 on the market value and systematic risk of commercial 
banks. We look at the individual and overall impact of announcements that advanced 
the implementation of FDICIA on a sample of commercial banks grouped by asset size. 
The results of the paper indicate that FDICIA did produce significant changes in the 
value of commercial banks. Specifically, the empirical results show that the values of 
large banks were positively affected as the passage of the proposed FDICIA became 
evident, while the increased probability of passage resulted in negative ~ue changes for 
smaller banks. The test results also show that the difference in market reactions for the 
two samples (large versus small banks) was significant. Finally, we find that the 
systematic risk of the sample of large banks decreased significantly over a period 
surrounding the passage of FDICIA, while no significant change was found for the 
sample of small banks. Thus, the passage of FDICIA appears to have favored large 
banks, both in terms of market value and systematic risk, at the expense of small banks. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section ll describes the background 
and economic consequences of FDICIA Section m introduces the data, methodology 
and hypotheses concerning returns to common stockholders of commercial banks. 
Section IV presents the resUlts for the stock returns. Section V examines the impact of 
the Act on systematic risk of the commercial banks. Finally, Section VI concludes the 
paper. 
ll. . Summary and Economic Consequences of FDICIA 
The introduction and passage of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 was the resUlt of severe pressure on the profitability and 
market share of commercial banks and the resUlting deterioration in the health of the 
bank deposit insurance fund. RegUlators feared that bank insolvency cost coUld rise so 
high that they woUld exhaust not only the resources of the Bank Insurance Fund (BIF), 
but the financial ability of healthy banks to pay for them. Haunted by the collapse of 
the savings and loan industry regUlators were moved to enact regulations which woUld 
prevent a similar occurrence in the banking industry. 
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While the stringent measures advocated by FDICIA reduced moral hazard 
opportunities by all banks, the impact may not have been uniform throughout the 
industry. As mentioned above, two particularly important regulatory changes introduced 
by FDICIA were the introduction of a risk-based deposit insurance premium schedule 
and restricted access to the Federal Resexve discount window. Both of these changes 
have conflicting influences which may affect values of small banks differently from large 
banks. 
Recent empirical evidence indicates that small banks appear to undertake 
significantly greater credit risk exposure (see Duan, Moreau and Sealey (forthcoming)). 
Therefore, the reassessment of FDIC premia on a risk-adjusted basis is more likely to 
adversely affect small banks. Since larger banks would be less liable for the restoration 
of the bank deposit insurance fund to its target level, the stock returns of large banks 
should increase in response to events signaling the positive probability of the passage of 
FDICIA. 
Conversely, Duan, Moreau and Sealey also provide evidence that large banks tend 
to have greater interest rate risk. FDICIA explicitly recognizes the importance of 
interest rate risk exposure in determining a bank's overall risk, and hence a bank's 
capital adequacy according to the FDIC risk-adjusted premium schedule. Therefore, it is 
feasible that if the FDIC risk-adjusted premium schedule places greater weight on 
interest rate risk than on credit risk, small banks may benefit at the cost of larger banks. 
FDICIA's emphasis on early closure and restricted access to subsidized credit 
from the Federal Resexve discount window may also have conflicting influences on the 
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relative impact of the Act on large and small banks. That is, the Federal Reserve's 
guidelines clearly state that smaller banks have greater access to its discount window for 
~adjustment credit" to meet liquidity needs.5 Since FDICIA intends to curb such discount 
window borrowing, the loss of this facility is more likely to adversely affect small bank 
than large bank stock returns. 
The greater access small banks have to the discount window, however, does not 
necessarily imply greater use by small banks. Indeed, recent theoretical and empirical 
literature on banks' Federal funds (hereafter fed funds) activity provides some contrary 
evidence. It has been found that larger, money center banks tend to be net borrowers 
(buyers) in this inter-bank, short-term money market, while small banks tend to be net 
sellers.6 Since the fed discount window and the fed funds market are alternative sources 
of funds for meeting liquidity needs,7 and since the Federal Reserve guidelines prolnoit a 
bank from borrowing at the discount window and simultaneously lending funds in any 
other market (thereby earning an arbitrage interest spread), it follows that small banks, 
which are net sellers in the fed funds market, rely relatively less on the fed's discount 
window. Thus, any restrictions regarding discount window borrowing may affect larger 
banks more than smaller banks since they appear to use the facility more (even though 
smaller banks may have greater access to it). 
Given the potential impact on commercial banks descnoed above, it is 
hypothesized in this paper that the passage of FDICIA should have produced a 
measurable impact on the returns to stockholders of these institutions and that 
stockholders of large banks experienced wealth changes which were different from those 
of stockholders of small banks. In the next sections of the paper, the effect of the Act 
on stock returns is examined. 
m. Data, Methodology and Hypotheses 
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The data to be analyzed consist of daily stock returns for commer~al banks that 
were either listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or the American Stock 
Exchange (ASE), or traded in the Over-the-Counter (OTC) market between December 
18, 1990 (when consideration of the new banking regulation was announced) and 
December 20, 1991 (when the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
was signed into law). To be included in the final sample a bank must trade during this 
entire period. Daily return data were collected from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) data tapes where usable price records were found for 414 banks. 
The tests performed on the sample require us to identify all dates on which 
important new information about the regulation became publicly available. News items 
pertaining to changes in regulation were compiled by examining the New York Times 
Index.. the Wall Street Journal Index. the Washin~on Post Index. trade journals in 
banking and FDIC news releases. Three time periods were examined: 1) the year 
preceding the formal proposal of the regulation to Congress; 2) the period of enactment; 
and 3) a period following the signing of FDICIA into law. Our search produced fifteen 
events in which important information about passage of the regulation was announced. 
Table !lists these fifteen events and the dates on which they occurred.8 
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INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
In order to test for stock price reaction to regulatory change, it is necessary that 
the events chosen for the test were unanticipated by the markets. Throughout the period 
of passage of FDICIA, uncertainty about the outcome of the bill was high. As stated in 
the Wall Street Journal on February 6, 1991 (p. A10) " ... prospects for passage are highly 
uncertain. In addition to controversies surrounding its own bill, the Bush bill will 
compete with several other large banking packages." Examining the articles relating to 
the fifteen events studied here, it appears that in several instances new information was 
contained in the announcement. For example, the first three events revealed the initial 
details of the banking overhaul. These announcements outlined, for the first time, 
specific regulations introduced in the bill. Event 7 (Banking bill clears House panel by 
36 to 0 vote) came as a surprise and sharply increased the probability of passage of the 
banking bill. While the vote was expected to be favorable prior to the event, it was not 
expected to be unanimous (thus, sending such a strong signal). As stated in the~ 
Street Journal article, "yesterday, though, it was a combination of Republicans and 
freshmen Democrats under intense lobbying pressure from banks that prevailed. ... " 
Event 8 (key lawmakers resisting quick passage of broad banking reform sought by Bush) 
also was unexpected. On June 11, 1991, the General Accounting Office warned that the 
bank insurance fund may be exhausted in six months. Later that day in a meeting 
between several key legislators and White House officials "several members said they 
believe that the more urgent matter of insurance fund should be addressed first, and 
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separately" (Wall Street Journal. June 12, 1991, p. A2). The members said they would 
not rush the banking bill through as requested by President Bush, thus reducing the 
probability of passage in 1991. A final, although not inclusive, example is event 12 
(House defeats banking bill). While the defeat of the banking bill was a · resounding one 
(324 to 89 to defeat the bill), the day prior to the vote the outcome was uncertain. As 
stated in the November 4, 1991 Wall Street Journal (p. A3), "Banking Committee 
Chairman Henry Gonzalez gave the legislation only a 50-50 chance of House passage. 
Rep. Chalmers Wylie of Ohio, the ranking Republican on the House banking panel said 
the outcome is 'too close to call.'" Thus many of the events examined here did, in fact, 
contain new information concerning passage of the regulation. 
In order to isolate the effect of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 on large versus sm.all banks, the sample of 414 banks was 
subdivided into two groups based on total assets at the end of 1990. Following the 
delineation of big versus small banks found by Allen, Peristiani and Saunders (1989) in 
the usage of fed funds and repurchase agreement markets, we define sm.all banks as 
those with book value of total assets less than or equal to $1 billion and large banks as 
those with book value of total assets greater than $1 billion. This break-down produced 
214 small banks and 200 large banks for our analysis. The event-study methodology 
described in the next section allows us to identify the impact of FDICIA using these 
subsets of banks. 
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B. Methodoloi}' 
The stock price impact of regulatory reform is estimated by employing a 
Multivariate Regression Model (MVRM) similar to_ that used in Schipper and Thompson 
(1983), Binder (1985a, 198Sb, 1988), Rose (1985), Smith, Bradley and Jarrell (1986) and 
Cornett and Tehranian (1989, 1990). The MVRM is used because it explicitly 
incorporates cross-sectional heteroscedasticity across equations and contemporaneous 
dependence of the disturbances into the estimation process, allowing joint hypotheses to 
be tested utilizing the F-statistic defined by Rao (1973). Specifically, as pointed out by 
Fama (1976), because the magnitude of the unsystematic risk differs across firms, the 
variance in abnormal returns will vary across firms. In addition, Schwert (1981) states 
that individual asset returns for firms in the same industry measured over a common 
time period are contemporaneously correlated because firms react similarly to any 
unanticipated event. Thus, contrary to the requirements of the standard event study 
methodology, residuals will not be identically and independently distributed. 
The MVRM model uses a system of seemingly unrelated equations which 
explicitly conditions the return generating process on the occurrence or nonoccurrence of 
an event. This conditioning is accomplished by appending zero-one dummy variables to 
the market model equation. The variable is set equal to one if an event occurred and 
equal to zero otherwise. Since the exact timing of the information release is unknown, a 
three-day event period is used corresponding to trading days t = -1, t = 0 and t = + 1 
relative to the announcement dates listed in Table 1. The coefficients multiplying the 
event dummy variables measure the event's impact on stock returns. The model, 
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therefore, implies a system of portfolio return equations for two portfolios: (1) large 










The return on a portfolio j ( = 1 and 2), of commercial banks on day 
t (T = daily observations from September 1990 through March 
1992); returns for each portfolio are weighted based on the full 
estimated covariance matrix of residuals in order to increase the 
efficiency of parameter estimates; 
the return on the CRSP equally weighted index on day t; 
an intercept coefficient for portfolio j ( = 1 and 2); 
risk coefficients for the jth portfolio (j = 1 and 2);10 
the effect of the K regulatory changes on the jth portfolio (K = 15 
in this study); 
dummy variables which equal 1 during the period of the kth 
announcement and 0 othetwise;11 and, 
random disturbances which are assumed to be normal and 
independent of the return on the market and the event 
announcement variable. 










-T x 1 vector (the elements of the vector are ~1, ~ ••• , ~J; 
a T x N matrix of independent variables which is the same for each 
equation in the system, N = K + 2 = 17 (the first column o(Jhis 
matrix is of l's, the second column is of the daily returns on ~' 
and the last fifteen columns are of dummy variables, Dtt for each of 
the fifteen events); 
a N x 1 vector of coefficients; 
a T x 1 vector of disturbances, 
R=Xi+i. (3) 
Estimation of the multivariate regression model in equation (3) assumes that the 
residuals are independent and identically distributed within each equation. Similar to 
Smith, Bradley and Jarrell (1986), however, it is unlikely that abnormal returns created 
by the events under study are fixed but unknown effects that are fully explained by the 
arguments in equation (3). If so, the conditional and unconditional distributions of 
abnormal returns would not be the same and the variance-Covariance matrix for the 
residuals in equation (3) would not be independent of the realization of the event. Thus, 
estimation of the system in equation (3) must be adjusted for the possible 
heteroscedasticity.12 To correct for time-series heteroscedasticity, a procedure developed 
by White (1982) and Chamberlain (1982) is employed. This procedure lets the residuals 
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in the variance-co-variance matrix vary across observations. 
The main advantage of the MVRM methodology is in the joint hypothesis testing, 
since the possibility of heteroscedasticity across equations and contemporaneous 
dependence of the disturbances are explicitly incorporated into the hypothesis test. To 
test the joint hypotheses in the MVRM, an F-test defined by Rao (1973) and used by 
Binder (198Sa, 198Sb) is employed.13 The joint hypothesis tests are of special 
importance in this study since, as discussed earlier, firms are expected to be differentially 
affected by FDICIA. 
C. Testable fupotheses 
Familiar hypotheses about average or cumulative average abnormal returns, as 
well as more general hypotheses, can be tested within the framework discussed above. 
Specifically, the following hypotheses are formulated and tested. 
Hypothesis 1: 
Hypothesis 2: 
y Jk = 0""; the abnormal return for each portfolio equal zero 
on announcement day k. 
:D~1yJl = o""; the overall economic impact of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 
equals zero for each portfolio. 
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fV. Results 
A Tests of fupothesis 1: The Abnormal Return for Each Portfolio Equal Zero on 
Announcement Day k 
Table 2 reports results on the MVRM analysis when the sample banks are 
grouped by book value of total assets. Panel A shows the portfolio abnormal returns and 
the t-statistics for each of the fifteen events across the 214 small banks and 200 large 
banks. These estimates are the coefficients of the dummy variables in equation 3. 
Column 1 lists the events and Columns 2 and 3 present the results for the two portfolios. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
As shown in Column 2 of Table 2 only one event produces positive and significant 
(at the 0.10 level) three-day cumulative average abnormal returns to stockholders of 
small banks, i.e., event 12 (banking bill voted down in the House), while four events 
produce negative and significant abnormal returns, i.e., event 1 (regulators press weak 
banks to reduce dividends), event 2 (banking blueprint may propose diversified holding 
companies), event 7 (banking bill clears House panel by 36 to 0 vote) and event 15 
(Bush signs banking bill). For the remaining ten events no statistically significant 
investor reaction was identified. Interestingly, the significant positive cumulative 
abnormal return is associated with an event which indicated a decreased probability of 
successful passage of the bill, while the four events demonstrating significant negative 
abnormal returns are all associated with events which signaled an increase in the 
probability of passage of the bill. 
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Two events (event 3: big banks would get vastly broader powers under Treasury's 
plan, and event ~5: Bush signs banking bill) produced positive cumulative abnormal 
returns. for the sample of large banks, while one event (event 8: key lawmakers resisting 
quick passage of broad banking reforms) resulted in significant negative abnormal 
returns for this group. Contrary to the sample of small banks, the positive abnormal 
returns are associated with events that signal an increase in the probability of passage of 
FDICIA, while the negative abnormal returns are associated with events that signal a 
decrease in passage. 
Binomial tests on the number of positive and negative abnormal returns for the 
events which were significant in Table 2 were all significant at better than the 0.05 level 
For events 1, 2, 7, 12 and 15, out of the 214 small banks 79, 85, 87, 119 and 94 
respectively, experienced positive abnormal returns. For events 3, 8 and 15, out of the 
200 large banks 120, 78 and 125, respectively, had positive abnormal returns. Thus the 
results do not appear to be driven by outliers. 
The results from Panel A of Table 2 allow us to reject the null hypothesis that the 
abnormal return for each portfolio equal zero on every announcement day. Rather, it 
appears that the values of large banks were positively affected as passage of the 
proposed FDICIA became evident, while the increased probability of passage created 
negative value changes for smaller banks. 
To further test hypothesis 1, panel B of Table 2 reports the F-statistic for the 
significance of the difference between portfolio abnormal returns for small versus large 
banks for each event. The F-statistic is significant at better than the 0.10 level for events 
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1, 2, 3, 7, 12 and 15. These results suggest that large banks reacted significantly more 
favorably to events which indicated an increased probability of passage and significantly 
less favorably to events w}lich indicated a decreased probability of passage of FDICIA. 
As discussed in Section n, it appears that small banks, with relatively larger credit 
risk and reduced ability to access the discount window (rather than large ·banks with 
relatively larger interest rate risk and heavy discount window use) experienced a heavier 
cost from the implementation of the new regulation. The new regulation meant that the 
largest banks would not have to shoulder more than their share of future costs of deposit 
insurance nor would they experience reduced access to funds to the same extent as the 
small banks. This resulted in indirect benefits to this group. 
B. . Test of fupothesis 2: The Overall Economic Impact of the federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act Equals Zero for Each Portfolio 
In addition to the identification of the significance for each announcement day, of 
particular interest to this study is a test of the hypothesis that the overall economic 
impact of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act was significant 
for the various portfolio groupings during the entire 15-event announcement period. 
Focusing attention on tests that measure abnormal returns on and around all fifteen 
announcements provides valuable information about the wealth impact of the new 
regulation on different firms within the commercial banking industry. 
Using the notation in equation (3), Hypothesis 2 can be expressed in the form 
LB = 'L 
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where L is a P x N matrix of constants with rank P(P s K), 13 is the N x 1 vector of 
coefficients estimated from (2), ' is a P x 1 vector of constants and P is the number 







JT- JN (1-LJ)'{L[X'(l:-1®1 )X]-1L'}-1(1 - Li) 
P c.B. - xm'<t-1®1 >cB - x.A) 
[aiJ], i, j = 1, 2, .•• , J; 
the Kronecker product; 
the number of daily return observations ( = 272) used for 
estimation parameter in equation {1); 
the number of portfolios tested; and 
the number of restrictions tested, 
is asymptotically distributed as F{P, JT- JN). 
Separating the sample on the basis of asset size, the F-statistic implied by H0 for 
the 214 small banks is 5.20 and for the 200 large banks is 2.05. Given the critical value 
F{14,504,0.01)14 = 3.00, these statistics suggest that the overall economic impact of 
FDICIA to stockholders of small banks was significantly different from the Act's impact 
to stockholders of large banks. Specifically, the approval of FDICIA resulted in 
significantly smaller abnormal returns to stockholders of small banks than that of large 
banks. The relatively large increase in the deposit insurance premiums and the more 
limited access to the discount window for the smallest banks caused the value of these 
banks to decrease and the value of the larger, healthier banks to increase during the 
period of consideration and passage of the new regulation. This pattern of wealth 
distribution within the commercial banking industry is consistent with the economic 
theory of Stigler (1971). 
V. The Impact of FDICIA on the Systematic Risk of Commercial Bai:llcs 
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In addition to tests of stock price reactions associated with information events 
leading to the passage of FDICIA, the economic theory of Stigler (1971) and Peltzman 
(1976) suggests that the riskiness of firms in the regulated industry must be examined as 
well. In particular, Peltzman hypothesizes that increases in regulation reduce the 
riskiness of the firms being regulated in terms of the demand and cost of uncertainty. 
With respect to FDICIA, this "buffering effect" hypothesis suggests that the systematic 
risk of banks should decrease during the enactment period if the regulation is viewed by 
the market as being more protective in nature and should increase if the regulation 
subjects banks to additional competitive pressures.15 
To test the Pe1tzman "buffering effect" hypothesis, the following three broad 
periods were used: 
1. pre-FDICIA enactment period (1/1/90 - 12/17 /90); 
2. FDICIA enactment period (12/18/90 - 12/20/91); 
3. post-FDICIA enactment period (12/21/91 - 12/21/92). 
Within each period we computed the systematic risk of the sample banks' common stock 
(splitting the sample based on the book value of assets). The results of these analyses 
are reported in Table 3. 
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INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
As seen in Table 3 the systematic risk, .B, of the small banks in the sample went 
from 1.0665 prior to consideration of FDICIA, to 0.9565 during the period of enactment, 
to 0.9124 following the passage of FDICIA. All three of these coefficients are significant 
at better than the 0.01 level. While there is a decreasing trend in systematic risk over 
the three time periods, the drop in the risk is not significant. The t-statistic for the 
difference in systematic risk in the first (prior to consideration of FDICIA) versus second 
(during the period in which FDICIA was considered and enacted) period is 1.62, which is 
insignificant at all conventional levels. The t-statistic for the difference in systematic risk 
in the second versus third (after passage of FDICIA) periods, 1.04, is also insignificant. 
For the sample of large banks, Table 3 reports a drop in systematic risk from 0.9554 
prior to consideration of FDICIA, to 0.8924 during the period of enactment, to 0.6182 
following the passage of FDICIA. All of these coefficients are significant at better than 
the 0.01 level. Further, the drop in systematic risk across the three time periods is 
significant. The difference in systematic risk in the first versus third period, 0.3372, is 
significant at better than 0.01level (t-statistic equals 4.05). The same level of 
significance is seen across periods two versus three (t-statistic equals 4.75), but not in 
periods one versus two (t-statistic equals 1.21). 
From the results presented in Table 3 it appears that the market reacted as if the 
passage of FDICIA created a "buffer" against competitive pressures for large banks, but 
had no affect on the competition extant for small banks. If we recall the two major 
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legislative changes associated with FDICIA and discussed earlier, some reasons for these 
differences in systematic risk of the banks are evident First, the change to risk-adjusted 
deposit insurance premia and the resulting shift of deposit insurance premiums from 
those banks which were least likely to need the coverage to those which had a higher 
probability of needing the coverage produced a "buffering effect" for the large (less risky) 
banks but not for the small (more risky) banks. Second, the loss of greater access to the 
discount window by small banks (relative to large banks) meant that these banks would 
be subject to greater increases in the competition for alternate sources of funds. Larger 
banks, which were not using the discount window to the same extent as small banks, 
were not subjected to this increase in competition for funds. Thus, consistent with the 
results for stock returns discussed in Section IV, FDICIA created a "buffer" for large 
banks against increases in competition in the industry which was not also. created for 
small banks. 
To see the effects of FDICIA on stock performance more clearly, we analyzed the 
stock returns over the three subperiods around the passage of FDICIA. In particular, we 
computed the market-model residuals (alpha) for the three time periods discussed above: 
1) prior to the consideration of FDICIA (1/1/90 - 12/17 /90); 2) during the enactment of 
FDICIA (12/18/90 - 12/29/91); and 3) following the passage of FDICIA (12/21/91 -
12/21/92). The results are reported in Table 3. From Table 3 its is seen that regardless 
of bank size or time period the market-model residuals are relatively low in magnitude 
and statistically insignificant There is no evidence indicating a particular market 
reaction around the passage of FDICIA. 
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VI. Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact· of events leading up to the passage of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 on the market value 
and systematic risk of commercial banks. Splitting the sample into large and small banks 
(based on the book value of total assets), we find that FDICIA did produce significant 
changes in the value of commercial banks. Specifically, the empirical res~ts document 
that the values of large banks were positively affected as passage of the proposed 
FDICIA became evident, while the increased probability of passage resulted in negative 
value changes for smaller banks. We also find that the systematic risk of the sample of 
large banks decreased significantly over the period surrounding passage of FDICIA, 
while no significant change was found for the sample of small banks. 
Two major changes associated with FDICIA were the introduction of risk-based 
deposit insurance and the limit of access to the Federal Reserve's discount window. The 
empirical results in this paper leads to the conclusion that the shift of deposit insurance 
premiums from those banks which were least likely to need the coverage to those which 
had a higher probability of needing coverage and the relatively larger impact of the 
reduction in access to the discount window, caused the value of small banks to decrease 
while the value of large banks increased. Additionally, the buffering that these 
legislative changes introduced for large banks relative to small banks resulted in a 
decrease in the systematic risk of large banks. 
Finally, our results suggest that FDICIA may have some far-reaching policy 
implications in the long run. Since FDICIA appears to be favorably slanted towards 
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large banks it may lead to a greater degree of consolidation in the U.S. banking industry. 
Such consolidation would make U.S. banks more competitive with foreign banks which 
have significa.ntly increased their presence in the U.S. over the past decade.16 Indeed, 
such consolidation may be an indirect policy objective and would be consistent with other 
explicit new regulatory controls that FDICIA has simultaneously imposed on foreign 
banks in the U.S., and which also aim to reduce the competitive edge that such banks 
have enjoyed in the past (see Section 202 of FDICIA). 
TABLE 1 
M~or Announcements and Announcement Dates Leading Up to the Approval 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act 
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Event Date Description 
1 12-18-90 Regulators press weak banks to reduc~ dividends to shore up equity 
capital 
2 1-4-91 Banking blueprint may propose diversified holding companies 
3 2-6-91 Big banks would get vastly broader powers under Treasury's plan 
4 3-21-91 Bush introduces bill to overhaul bank industry 
5 4-11-91 Fed signals its support for major parts of Treasury plan to overhaul 
banking; Bush's bank overhaul plan faces delay in House panel 
6 4-24-91 Administration may scale down its banking bill; broad bill to reform 
banking industry gets bipartisan support of House panel 
7 5-24-91 Banking bill clears House panel by 36 to 0 vote 
8 6-12-91 Key lawmakers resisting quick passage of broad ba.nking reforms 
sought by Bush 
9 7-1-91 House panel approves bill to reform banking laws 
10 8-2-91 Senate panel clears plan to discourage long-term Fed loans to weak 
banks; Senate panel's banking bill faces hurdles 
11 10-4-91 Banking panel in House holds to broad bill 
12 11-5-91 Banking bill is voted down in the House 
13 11-15-91 House defeats banking bill 
14 11-20-91 ·House and Senate pass bill 




Test of Hypothesis That All Abnormal Returns for Each Portfolio 
Jointly Equal zero 
Panel A of this table presents portfolio abnormal returns and t-statistics (in parenthesis) for 214 
small and 200 large banks around each of the fifteen events. These estimates are from a regression 
of portfolio returns (weighted based on the full estimated covariance matrix of residuals) and 
dummy variables corresponding to the fifteen events. Each dummy variable equals 1 during the 
three-day period (t = -1, t = 0, and t = 1 relative to each announcement) and 0 otherwise. Panel 
B presents the F-statistic for the difference in portfolio abnormal returns. 
Panel A: Portfolio abnormal returns (in percent) 
Event Small Banks Large Banks 














































~vents are described in Table 1. 
bSignificant at the .01 level. 
csignificant at the .05 level. 
















































Systematic Risk (Betas) and Market-Model Residuals (Alphas) for Small and Large• 
Commercial Banks During Three Periods SWTOunding the Enactment of FDICIA: 1) A Period 
Prior to Consideration of FDICIA; 2) A Period During the Enactment of FDICIA; and 3) A 
Period Following the Passage of FDICIA 
Small Banks (N = 214) J..ame BanJcs (N = 200) 
Coefficient T-statistic P-valuc Coefficient T-statistic P-valuc 
1) Prior to Consideration of FDICIA, 1/1/90 - 12/17/90 
Systematic Risk, 8 1.0665 25.960 b 0.0001 0.9554 42 .812 b 0.0001 
Market-Model Residual, a -0 .0005 0.270 0.7871 0.0002 0.584 0.5594 
2) During Enactment of FDICIA, 12/18/90 - 12/'11J/91 
Systematic Risk, 8 0.9565 34.518 b 0.0001 0.8924 37.688 b 0.0001 
Market-Model Residuals, a 0.0003 0.301 0.7638 0.0001 0.223 0.8235 
3) Following Passage of FDICIA, 12/21/91 - 12/21/92 
Systematic Risk, 8 0.9124 35.013 b 0.0001 0.6182 36.744 b 0.0001 
Market-Model Residuals, a 0.0001 0.481 0.7871 -0 .0002 -0 .250 0.8030 
•small banks are defined as those with book value of total assets less than or equal to $1 
billion and large banks are defined as those with book value of total assets greater than $1 
billion. 
bSignificant at the .01 level. 
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F001NOTES 
1There are a host of papers that address this issue of mispriced deposit insurance 
both theoretically and empirically. See, for example, Chen and Mazumdar (1994a, 
1994b), Crouhy and Galai (1991), Flannery (1989), Pennacchi (1987), Ronn and Verma 
(1986), Marcus (1984), Marcus and Shaked (1984) and Buser, Chen and Kane (1981). 
2Peltzman (1976) expands upon Stigler's (1971) model in an effort to determine 
the optimal size of the dominant group. He finds that the cost of using the regulatory 
process limits not only the size of the dominant group but also the gains. Posner (1974), 
Pyle (1974), Scott and Mayer (1971) and Taggart and Greenbaum (1978) provide 
additional insights into the economic effects of regulation. 
3Allen and Wilhelm (1988) and Cornett and Tehranian (1989) test stock market 
reactions to the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980. 
Brickley and James (1986) analyze how access to deposit insurance affects common stock 
returns of financial institutions during periods of financial distress. Cornett and 
Tehranian (1990) use stock returns to measure the effects ·of the Gam-St. Germain 
Depository Institutions Act of 1982. Flannery and James (1984) examine the relation 
between interest rate sensitivity of common stock returns and the maturity composition 
of the firm's nominal contracts. Musumeci and Sinkey (1990a) examine bank security 
returns surrounding the announcement of Brazil's debt moratorium in 1987. Musumeci 
and Sinkey (1990b) use event-study methodology to examine security returns for the 
twenty-five largest U.S. bank holding companies surrounding Citicorp's $3 billion loan-
loss-reserve decision of May 19, 1987. Sundaram, Rangan and Davidson (1992) use 
capital market data to examine the impact of the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989. Finally, Unal (1989) provides a comparative 
analysis of the switching-regressions method and variance-partition procedure within the 
context of deposit-rate ceiling change announcements. 
4As a result, a regulatory effect which has been documented is the incurrence of 
pecuniary economies by the regulated firm in its resource market. Furthermore, because 
of the protected nature of its product market, all or a portion of the operational and 
financial risk is reduced. These additional returns may be thought of as indirect 
subsidies passed from consumers and non-regulated producers to the regulated firm. 
Thus, investors react to the indirect subsidy by factoring above-normal returns into the 
assessment of future profitability. 
5See Federal Reserve Discount Window. October 1980, Federal Reserve 
Publication. 
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6Several theoretical explanations have been offered to explain this phenomenon. 
First, it has been argued that small banks are more risk averse than big banks. 
Therefore, small banks prefer to raise funds through traditional deposit markets (see Ho 
and Saunders (1985) and Allen, Peristiani and Saunders (1989}, among others). Second, 
small banks have local monopoly power in their deposit markets and thus, are able to 
obtain deposit funds at relatively lower costs while charging higher loan rates (see 
Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Rose and Kolari (1985)). A third explanation is based 
on information asymmetries. Allen and Saunders (1986) argue that since fed funds are 
uncollateralized, lenders (fed funds sellers) perceive smaller banks to have higher default 
risks and thus offer them fed funds at higher rates or even ration them out. 
Informational asymmetries would therefore limit small banks' access to fed funds. 
7Chen and Mazumdar (1992) focus on the close link between reserve management 
and fed funds purchases as alternative sources of liquidity. They provide an inventory 
theoretic explanation of the large-small bank dichotomy observed in the fed funds 
market and also provide an integrated framework that incorporates the three influences 
on fed funds behavior listed in footnote 6. · 
8Many other announcements besides the fifteen listed in Table 1 were made 
concerning the new regulation. For example, on May 2, 1991 Democrats on the House 
Banking Committee voted to consider the banking legislation before a bill to bolster the 
bank deposit insurance fund. This increased the probability that a decision on the bill 
would come before the end of 1991. In this paper, however, only those announcements 
which we felt referred to major changes in the reform, stumbling blocks to passage or 
passage by a key group are analyzed. 
~e models used in previous studies are slightly different from equation (1). We 
employ the market return at several leads and lags as an explanatory variable to 
overcome the possibility of nonsynchronous trading in our sample (see Scholes and 
Williams, 1977). 
1'7he pre (before 12-18-90) and post (after 12-20-91) FDICA periods were 
examined for significant shifts in the risk parameters for both subgroups of banks. A 
significant change in .Bj for the large bank subgroup during the period prior to the first 
announcement relating to the new regulation (12-18-90) and a period after the regulation 
was approved (12-20-91} was found. We discuss this in detail in Section V of the paper. 
11Depending on what time during the trading day the announcement was made, 
either the publication day or the day before might be the relevant announcement day. 
Since the exact time of the announcement is unknown, the announcement period is the 
three trading days, t = -1, t = 0 and t = + 1, relative to the published announcement. 
12See Smith, Jarrell and Bradley (1986, p. 477) for a detailed discussion of this 
situation. 
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13We use an F-test because Binder (1985b) presents evidence that in some cases 
the Wald test might be biased against the null hypothesis when there are 60 or even 250 
observations per equation. 
1'7he degrees of freedom, 504, equal (2 (the number of portfolios) • 272 (the 
number of observations)) - (2 (the number of portfolios) *20 (the number of 
independent variables in the regression equation 1) ). 
15Chen and Merville (1986) also test for a "buffering effect" associated with the 
breakup of AT&T. 
16por instance, in 1987 alone business loans at U.S. branch offices of foreign banks 
grew five times faster than at U.S.-owned banks (see Mazumdar 1990). 
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